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OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Atlantic City Associates (“ACA”) hired Carter & Burgess Consultants, Inc. 
(“C&B”) to oversee construction of a development in Atlantic City, New Jersey.  
Following numerous delays, ACA sued C&B and obtained a total recovery, including 
attorneys‟ fees, costs and interest, of nearly $13 million.  In this appeal, C&B argues that 
the District Court (1) failed to apply several clauses in the parties‟ agreements prohibiting 
ACA from recovering consequential damages, and (2) failed to enforce an additional 
clause limiting C&B‟s total liability to its compensation.  We will vacate the judgment of 
the District Court and remand this case for further proceedings.   
I.  Background 
A.  Facts 
1.  The Proposal 
On November 15, 2000, C&B submitted a proposal (the “Proposal”) to ACA to 
provide architectural and design services for a mixed-use retail and commercial project 
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called “The Walk.”  The project consisted of twelve buildings spread over seven city 
blocks.   
 Three provisions of the Proposal are relevant to this appeal.  First, the Proposal 
included a clause providing that C&B would not be liable to ACA for any amount in 
excess of its compensation: 
[Section F, Paragraph 1] 
 
To the fullest extent permitted by law, the total liability, in the aggregate, of 
[C&B] . . . to [ACA] . . . for any and all injuries, claims, losses, expenses or 
damages whatsoever arising out of or in any way related to [C&B‟s] 
services, the project or this Agreement, from any cause . . . including but 
not limited to, the negligence, errors, omissions, strict liability, breach of 
contract, misrepresentation or breach of warranty of [C&B] . . . shall not 
exceed the total compensation received by [C&B]  under this Agreement. 
 
(A323.) 
 Second, the Proposal included a clause providing that C&B would not be liable to 
ACA for consequential damages: 
[Section F, Paragraph 4]   
 
Under no circumstances shall [C&B] be liable to [ACA] for indirect, 
special or consequential damages including but not limited to loss of use, 
loss of profit, or claims for delay, impact or disruption damages made by 
[ACA]. 
 
(A323.) 
 
 Third, the Proposal contained a clause permitting attorneys‟ fees in the event of a 
breach: 
[Section H] 
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In the event of a default or breach of this Agreement by [ACA], [C&B‟s] 
remedies shall be all those available at law and, in addition, [C&B] shall be 
entitled to receive, from [ACA], the reasonable legal and/or collection fees, 
costs, and expenses incurred in connection with curing any breach or 
default arising hereunder and or/instituting or defending successfully any 
action or proceeding based upon such default or breach (including the 
preparation for such actions or proceedings).  [ACA] shall enjoy the same 
rights as [C&B] in the event of a default or breach of this Agreement by 
[C&B]. 
 
(A324.) 
 
2.  The Agreements 
 
 Following the submission of the Proposal, the parties reached agreement, with 
their agreement reduced to writing at two different times.  The first agreement, dated June 
18, 2001, pertained to the majority of the services necessary for the project.  The second 
agreement, dated May 23, 2002, pertained to services necessary to relocate a bus terminal.  
The legal provisions contained in the two agreements are essentially identical, and we 
refer to them jointly as the “Agreements.” 
The Agreements, which provide that they are governed by New Jersey law, contain 
several relevant provisions.  First, the Agreements provide that they incorporate the 
Proposal, absent a conflict: 
 1.4.1.3  Other Documents as follows: 
 (List the other documents, if any, forming part of the Agreement.) 
[C&B‟s] Proposal dated November 15, 2000, except where it might result 
in a conflict with this Agreement, and if such conflict exists, this 
Agreement shall prevail. 
 
(A224, 407.) 
 
Second, the Agreements contain a mutual waiver of consequential damages: 
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1.3.6 CLAIMS FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
[C&B] and [ACA] waive consequential damages for claims, disputes, or 
other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Agreement.  This 
mutual waiver is applicable, without limitation, to all consequential 
damages due to either party‟s termination in accordance with Paragraph 
1.3.8. 
 
(A221, 404.) 
 
 Third, under the heading “ERRORS AND OMISSIONS INSURANCE AND 
INDEMNIFICATION,” the Agreements contain the following three paragraphs: 
2.9.2.1  [C&B] shall maintain through the period of this Project and for 
three (3) years thereafter, a standard policy of errors and omissions 
insurance with an insurance company reasonably satisfactory to the [ACA].  
[C&B] shall also maintain insurance coverage for comprehensive general 
liability, automotive liability and workers‟ compensation in forms and 
amounts set forth on Exhibit A hereto . . . . 
 
2.9.2.2  [C&B] agrees to indemnify, hold harmless, protect [ACA] . . . 
against any and all claims, loss, liability, damage, costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney‟s fees, to the extent caused by the negligent 
acts, errors, or omissions of [C&B] . . . . 
 
2.9.2.3  All services provided by [C&B] hereunder shall be performed with 
such reasonable promptness as to cause no delay in the work or in the 
activities of [ACA], the Construction Manager, or the Contractors, and shall 
be consistent with the professional skill and judgment which can be 
reasonably expected from architectural firms of a comparable size 
performing services similar to those required hereunder for high quality 
retail and entertainment spaces in the Eastern  United States, and [C&B] 
shall be responsible for all services provided hereunder whether such 
services are provided directly by [C&B] or the consultants hired by [C&B].  
[C&B] shall perform all duties and services and make all decisions called 
for hereunder promptly and without delay and will give this Project such 
priority in its office as is necessary to cause [C&B‟s] services hereunder to 
be timely and properly performed.  
 
(A237, 420.) 
 7 
B.  Procedural History 
 ACA commenced this action by filing a complaint against C&B on June 27, 2005.  
ACA later filed four amended complaints, all of which asserted claims against C&B for 
both breach of contract and professional negligence. 
 On March 26, 2008, C&B moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling 
that it was not liable for (1) consequential damages, in light of Section F, Paragraph 4 of 
the Proposal and Paragraph 1.3.6 of the Agreements, or (2) damages in excess of its 
compensation, in light of Section F, Paragraph 1 of the Proposal.  On November 13, 2008, 
the District Court issued an opinion that (1) declined to issue guidance as to what types of 
damages were consequential, and (2) held that because the limitation on damages in 
excess of compensation in Section F, Paragraph 4 conflicted with Paragraph 2.9.2.2 of the 
Agreements, it was not incorporated into the Agreements. 
 On April 13, 2009, C&B filed a motion in limine to bar ACA from introducing 
evidence of consequential damages relating to loss of use, loss of profit, and claims for 
delay, impact or disruption.  On June 18, 2009, the District Court denied this motion in 
substantial part. 
 Following a thirteen-day trial, the jury returned a verdict on July 7, 2009, awarding 
ACA the following damages: 
 $1,307,073.00 Additional construction costs to fix errors 
 $3,617,442.00 Lost rental income 
 $1,688,048.30 Additional payments to contractors due to delay 
 $996,231.00  Additional administrative costs 
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(A24-27.)  These damages were awarded on both the negligence and contract claims. 
 On March 31, 2010, the District Court denied C&B‟s motions for judgment as a 
matter of law or for a new trial.  In a separate order, it granted ACA‟s motion for 
attorneys‟ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest -- fees in the amount of $2,491,373.50; 
costs in the amount of $949,311.31; and pre-judgment interest in the amount of 
$1,653,088.71. These additions brought ACA‟s total recovery to $12,702,567.82. 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The correct 
interpretation of a contract is a question of law that we review de novo.  United States v. 
Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008). 
B.  Availability of Consequential Damages   
 C&B‟s primary argument is that the District Court erred by allowing ACA to 
recover consequential damages, which it defines to include $3,617,442.00 of lost rental 
income, $1,688,048.30 for additional payments to contractors due to delay, and 
$996,231.00 of additional administrative costs.  We agree.  Although the District Court 
correctly determined that C&B was not liable for ACA‟s consequential damages, its 
analysis of what damages were consequential was erroneous.   
 The essence of the District Court‟s determination was that Paragraph 2.9.2.3 of the 
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Agreements contained an express promise not to delay the project and that any damages 
following foreseeably from a breach of that provision were necessarily direct.  As the 
District Court explained in denying C&B‟s motion for post-trial relief: 
When a promise not to delay is breached, it necessarily follows that delay 
damages may directly result. Likewise, when the contract containing the 
promise not to delay is for the design of commercial real estate property 
created solely for the purpose of generating rental income, it necessarily 
follows that lost rent damages may directly result from a breach. 
Accordingly, it was appropriate to allow evidence of such damages at trial. 
 
(A49-50.) 
 But even if it is assumed that Paragraph 2.9.2.3 constituted a promise not to delay 
the project, as opposed to merely providing a standard of care, damages are not “direct” 
whenever they are the foreseeable result of a breach.  Rather, as we have explained, “New 
Jersey has adopted the traditional rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 
145 (1854), that consequential damages are available for those delays that may fairly and 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties to the contract at 
the time it was made, as the probable result of the breach.”  Jaasma v. Shell Oil Co., 412 
F.3d 501, 511 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).  
In other words, the fact that damages are foreseeable does not necessarily render them 
direct.  Rather, New Jersey law allows for the recovery of consequential damages when 
they are foreseeable.   
 Rather than turning on foreseeability, the difference between direct and 
consequential damages depends on whether the damages represent (1) a loss in value of 
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the other party‟s performance, in which case the damages are direct, or (2) collateral 
losses following the breach, in which case the damages are consequential.  See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 cmt. c (1981).  As the Second Circuit has 
explained,  
Lost profits are consequential damages when, as a result of the breach, the 
non-breaching party suffers loss of profits on collateral business 
arrangements. In the typical case, the ability of the non-breaching party to 
operate his business, and thereby generate profits on collateral transactions, 
is contingent on the performance of the primary contract. When the 
breaching party does not perform, the non-breaching party‟s business is in 
some way hindered, and the profits from potential collateral exchanges are 
“lost.”  . . . 
 
By contrast, when the non-breaching party seeks only to recover money that 
the breaching party agreed to pay under the contract, the damages sought 
are general damages.  The damages may still be characterized as lost profits 
since, had the contract been performed, the non-breaching party would have 
profited to the extent that his cost of performance was less than the total 
value of the breaching party‟s promised payments.  But, in this case, the lost 
profits are the direct and probable consequence of the breach. 
 
Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 109 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted).  A case on which ACA relies makes the same point: 
Direct damages refer to those which the party lost from the contract itself 
— in other words, the benefit of the bargain — while consequential 
damages refer to economic harm beyond the immediate scope of the 
contract.  Lost profits, under appropriate circumstances, can be recoverable 
as a component of either (and both) direct and consequential damages.  
Thus, for example, if a services contract is breached and the plaintiff 
anticipated a profit under the contract, those profits would be recoverable as 
a component of direct, benefit of the bargain damages. If that same breach 
had the knock-on effect of causing the plaintiff to close its doors, 
precluding it from performing other work for which it had contracted and 
from which it expected to make a profit, those lost profits might be 
recovered as “consequential” to the breach. 
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Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 Because the bulk of the damages sought by ACA were consequential, in the sense 
that they went beyond the loss in value of C&B‟s performance, ACA was barred from 
collecting them pursuant to Paragraph 1.3.6 of the Agreements and Section F, Paragraph 
4 of the Proposal.  The only damages representing a loss in value of ACA‟s performance 
were the additional construction costs necessary to repair the errors, as these were the 
damages that allowed it recover the value of what it had bargained for under the contract.
1
 
C.  Interplay of Paragraph 2.9.2.2; Section F, Paragraph 1; and Section H 
 Because the substantive recovery to which ACA was entitled was only the 
approximately $1.3 million of additional construction costs, it is possible that — even 
after attorneys‟ fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest are added to this total — ACA‟s 
total recovery will not exceed C&B‟s total compensation under the contract, which 
totaled approximately $3.4 million.  If that is the case, it will not be necessary to consider 
Section F, Paragraph 1 of the Proposal, which limits ACA‟s recovery to C&B‟s 
compensation.  To the extent that ACA‟s total recovery exceeds this figure, however, it 
                                                 
1
 This conclusion is buttressed by Section F, Paragraph 4 of the Proposal, which provides 
that consequential damages include but are not limited to “loss of use, loss of profit, or 
claims for delay, impact or disruption damages.”  (A323.)  See McNally Wellman Co. v. 
N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1195 (2d Cir. 1995) (“While ordinarily the 
precise demarcation between direct damages and incidental or consequential damages is 
an issue of fact, in this case the parties themselves defined the scope of excluded damages 
in the contract.”). 
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will be necessary to do so.  As we explain, the District Court erred in concluding that 
Section F, Paragraph 1 did not apply to this action. 
1.  Paragraph 2.9.2.2 Does Not Apply to This Action 
 The District Court reasoned that Section F, Paragraph 1 of the Proposal conflicted 
with Paragraph 2.9.2.2 of the Agreements, and thus that it was not incorporated.  
Underlying this analysis was the District Court‟s conclusion that Paragraph 2.9.2.2 
applied to a first-party dispute between ACA and C&B. 
 When the District Court issued its rulings in this case, several non-precedential 
decisions of this Court suggested that indemnification clauses might apply to first-party 
disputes between parties to a contract.  See, e.g., SBA Network Servs., Inc. v. Telecom 
Procurement Servs., Inc., 250 F. App‟x 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2007).  Subsequently,  however, 
decisions from both this Court and the New Jersey Appellate Division have foreclosed 
any such argument.   
 In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010), we 
analyzed the following indemnification clause: 
Seller agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless Buyer from all claims, 
actions, losses, damages and expenses resulting from any injury to persons, 
damage to property or action by any regulatory agency, arising out of or in 
any way associated with the design, installation, and/or operation of any 
production formulation, packaging, or support equipment (including 
equipment owned by Seller, Buyer or Third Parties), used in the production, 
processing or handling of the product(s) sold hereunder and all raw 
materials used in the production. 
 
Id. at 254 (alteration omitted).  Rejecting the argument that the clause could apply to a 
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first-party dispute between parties to the contract, we explained,  
Under New Jersey law, we must interpret the parties‟ contract according to 
its plain language, by reading the document as a whole in a fair and 
common sense manner.  We must also endeavor to avoid ignoring certain 
words or reading the contract in such a way as to make any words 
meaningless.  In other words, we must interpret the word “indemnify” in 
relation to the words “defend” and “hold harmless.”  When we apply these 
principles to the clause on which IFF relies, it becomes clear that, just as 
Dammann cannot “defend” IFF from itself or “hold harmless” IFF for IFF‟s 
own wrong, Dammann cannot “indemnify” IFF for IFF‟s own loss.  Put 
another way, the only sensible reading of that clause evidences a 
requirement that third-party liability exist for the clause to be triggered. 
IFF‟s interpretation impermissibly reads that requirement out of the 
contract. 
   
Id. at 255 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).  Similarly, in 
Investors Savings Bank v. Waldo Jersey City, LLC, 12 A.3d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2011), the New Jersey Appellate Division explained that “it is axiomatic . . . that an 
indemnification agreement must be based upon the indemnitee‟s claim to obtain recovery 
from the indemnitor for liability incurred to a third party.”  Id. at 270 (internal quotation 
marks ommitted).  Thus, “[i]t is only when the indemnitee is found liable to a third party 
that the indemnification agreement may be triggered.”  Id. at 271.  Because ACA never 
pleaded the theory that it was seeking indemnification for third-party losses, Section 
2.9.2.2 of the Agreements is not implicated here, and thus Paragraph F, Section 1 of the 
Proposal is incorporated into the Agreements.
2
 
                                                 
2
 ACA has also suggested that the limitation on damages was not incorporated into the 
Proposal because it conflicts with Section 2.9.2.1 of the Agreements, which required 
C&B to carry insurance in an amount in excess of its compensation.  We find this 
suggestion unpersuasive, both because the insurance that C&B was required to carry 
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2.  The Availability of Attorneys‟ Fees 
 Because Paragraph 2.9.2.2 does not apply to this lawsuit, the District Court erred 
in awarding attorneys‟ fees under that provision.  We conclude, however, that attorneys‟ 
fees are available to ACA under Section H of the Proposal.   
 The District Court reasoned that Section H was not incorporated into the 
Agreements because it conflicted with the Agreements‟ bar on consequential damages.  
This conclusion is incorrect, however, as attorneys‟ fees are not properly viewed as a 
form of consequential damages — or as damages at all.  See, e.g., New Flyer of Am., Inc. 
v. Mid-Newark, L.P., No. L-5323-08, 2010 WL 2794249, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
July 6, 2010) (refusing to award attorneys‟ fees and noting that “attorney‟s fees are not 
normally a proper measure of contract damages.”).  Section H is therefore incorporated 
into the Agreements and permits ACA to recover its attorneys‟ fees.3   
3.  The Application of Section F, Paragraph 1 
 Given that Section F, Paragraph 1 is incorporated into the Agreements, should the 
District Court conclude that ACA would otherwise be entitled to substantive recovery, 
fees, costs, and interest in excess of C&B‟s compensation, the question arises as to 
                                                                                                                                                             
included automotive and workers‟ compensation insurance and because C&B may simply 
have determined that it was rational to obtain insurance in excess of its anticipated 
liability. 
3
 Given our disposition of this appeal, ACA‟s substantive recovery will be significantly 
reduced and the District Court may find it appropriate to revisit the amount of attorneys‟ 
fees, and perhaps of costs, that it ordered.  Indeed, with reference to attorneys‟ fees, the 
District Court, analogizing to contingency fee cases, has indicated that one-third of a 
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whether the limitation on damages contained in Section F, Paragraph 1 applies only to 
substantive recovery, or also to pre-judgment interest and attorneys‟ fees and costs. 
 We conclude that the attorneys‟ fees and costs authorized by Section H of the 
Proposal are not subject to the limitation on damages expressed in Section F, Paragraph 1 
of the Proposal, as Section H provides that the prevailing party will be entitled to all 
remedies at law and, in addition, to its fees and costs.  Whether pre-judgment interest is 
subject to the limitation on damages is not clear from the face of the documents, however, 
and we leave it to the District Court to consider this issue in the first instance should it be 
necessary for it to do so.  In this connection, we would expect the District Court to revisit 
the issue of the amount of pre-judgment interest, which was awarded based on the 
$7,608,794.30 judgment that has now, in large part, been set aside. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The only substantive compensation to which ACA was contractually entitled was 
$1,307,073.00 for “additional construction costs to fix errors.”  Additionally, Section F, 
Paragraph 1 of the Proposal does not conflict with Paragraph 2.9.2.2 of the Agreements, 
and thus is incorporated into the Agreements.  We will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
4
   
                                                                                                                                                             
substantive recovery is “routinely deemed appropriate” and seemed “eminently 
reasonable” in this case.  (A63.12.)  
4
 We have considered and rejected ACA‟s additional arguments, including those raised in 
the cross-appeal.  The only argument requiring any discussion is ACA‟s contention that it 
is entitled to consequential damages and damages in excess of C&B‟s compensation on 
its tort claim, even if the contract claim is limited for the reasons explained in this 
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Opinion.  Critically, however, Paragraph 1.3.6 applies to “consequential damages for 
claims, disputes, or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this agreement,” 
and Section F, Paragraph 1 applies to “any and all injuries, claims, losses, expenses or 
damages whatsoever arising out of or in any way related to [C&B‟s] services, the project 
or this Agreement.”  Both clauses are written sufficiently broadly to apply to an extra-
contractual tort claim.  Cf., e.g., Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“In sum, when phrases such as „arising under‟ and „arising out of‟ appear in arbitration 
provisions, they are normally given broad construction, and are generally construed to 
encompass claims going to the formation of the underlying agreements.”). 
